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Biometric Technologies 
  
Biometric technologies are increasingly being 
used in the UK to help identify individuals. This 
note gives an overview of these technologies, 
their applications, and the policy challenges 
that arise from their use. 
 
Overview 
 Biometric technologies enable the 
identification of people based on their 
physical or behavioural characteristics. 
 They have the potential to make accessing 
services more secure and convenient, and 
to provide new tools for law enforcement. 
 There is debate over whether the regulation 
of biometrics is adequate, especially for 
police use of facial recognition technology. 
 Biometrics raise potential challenges, 
particularly relating to privacy, public 
acceptance and the potential for bias. 
 The Home Office has just published its 
delayed strategy for biometrics. 
Background 
Biometric technologies identify individuals based on their 
distinguishing physical and behavioural attributes, such as 
fingerprints, face, and voice (Box 1).1,2 Unlike passwords or 
traditional identity documents, biometric attributes are 
inherently linked to a person and cannot usually be lost or 
forgotten, potentially providing greater security and 
convenience. They are used in two main ways: 
 Verification – ensuring that someone is who they say 
they are, by comparing a biometric attribute to a 
previously obtained ‘reference’ record, e.g. checking that 
an individual’s face matches the photo in their passport. 
 Identification – determining who a person is, by 
comparing a biometric attribute against a set of reference 
records collected from multiple people, e.g. comparing a 
fingerprint collected from a crime scene to a fingerprint 
database of previous offenders. 
The global market for biometrics is estimated to grow to £21 
billion by 2022 (a 130% increase on 2016).3 Several factors 
are contributing to this rise, including the vulnerability and 
inconvenience of passwords,4-6 increasing use of mobile 
devices with biometric capabilities,7,8 and the growing power 
of biometric systems, which have benefited from advances 
in computing technologies such as artificial intelligence.9-11 
The Commons Science and Technology Committee and 
others have highlighted a lack of Government oversight and 
regulation of certain aspects of biometric technology.12-14 
The Home Office has just published a strategy for 
biometrics, which was originally expected in 2013.15-18 
Box 1. Types of Biometric Attribute 
In general, biometric attributes are universal and permanent. They can 
be measured and analysed to produce a digital signature that is 
sufficiently distinctive to an individual to enable their identification.19 
They are often split into two types: 
 Physical – derived from a physical attribute, these include a 
person’s DNA (from which an essentially unique DNA profile of 32 
numbers can be derived),20 fingerprint,1 iris,21 hand geometry 
(the shape and size of the hand),1 and face (the spatial relationship 
between facial features).21  
 Behavioural – derived from a behavioural attribute, these include 
a person’s gait (how they walk),22,23 typing pattern (how they use 
a keyboard or smartphone touchscreen),1,24 voice (determined by 
factors such as accent and the shape and size of the vocal tract),25 
and signature (the way they sign their name).1 Some behavioural 
attributes will also be influenced by physical characteristics. 
 
Applications of Biometrics 
The applications of biometric systems (Box 2) include 
securing access to financial and government services, 
restricting access to physical locations, controlling borders, 
and law enforcement. 
Financial Services 
As of 2016, mobile apps (software installed on a 
smartphone or tablet) are the most common way to access 
online banking services in the UK.26 With smartphones 
increasingly having the ability to collect and analyse 
biometric data,7 many banks now offer biometric verification 
on mobile banking apps, often using fingerprint or facial 
recognition.27-29 Some banks, such as HSBC and Barclays, 
offer voice recognition as a means of identity verification 





for their telephone banking customers.32,33 Internet 
commerce fraud in the UK increased from an estimated 
£135 million in 2010 to £309 million in 2016.34 A new EU 
Payment Services Directive aims to address this by 
requiring users to provide at least two pieces of information 
to prove their identity, one of which can be a biometric 
attribute.35 MasterCard says that all customers will be able 
to use fingerprint or facial recognition to verify their identity 
for online payments by April 2019.36  
Government Services 
Currently, biometrics are not widely used to access public 
services in the UK. HM Revenue and Customs allows users 
to access its mobile app using a fingerprint and uses voice 
recognition to speed up security checks for people 
telephoning them.37 The Government Digital Service says 
that it is working with Government departments to support 
their use of biometrics.38 Some countries use biometrics 
more extensively for public service provision. For example, 
Portugal’s citizen card holds fingerprint data, allowing 
biometric verification when accessing public services.39 
India’s Aadhaar identity scheme has collected fingerprints, 
iris and facial images of over one billion Indian residents, to 
facilitate access to government services.40  
Physical Area Access 
Biometrics have been used to restrict access to buildings or 
other sites since the 1970s.41,42 Today, uses include:  
 Controlling access to critical infrastructure – e.g. the 
British Army uses fingerprint and iris recognition to control 
access to some of its bases.43 
 Controlling access to construction sites – e.g. hand 
geometry and iris recognition were used to manage 
access to the site of London’s Olympic Park.44 
 Reducing document use – e.g. British Airways is trial-
ling facial recognition technology for self-service boarding 
without presenting a boarding pass or passport.45  
Box 3. Government Databases 
UK Government databases that hold biometric information include: 
 IDENT1 – fully operational since 2004, this replaced the National 
Automated Fingerprint Identification System. As of December 
2017, it contained the fingerprints of around 8m people and just 
under 2m unmatched crime scene fingerprints.13 
 NDNAD – the National DNA Database was established in 1995.20  
In March 2018, it contained the DNA profiles of an estimated 5.3m 
people and almost 0.6m crime scene profiles.46,47 
 IABS – the Immigration and Asylum Biometrics System came into 
operation in 2012. In 2015, it contained the fingerprints and facial 
images for around 15.5m people who had applied for visas or 
asylum in the UK.48-50 It can be searched by the police.48 
 PND – the Police National Database has been in place since 2010 
and enables sharing of intelligence information between UK police 
forces. As of February 2018, it held 21m images from people who 
had been arrested. An estimated 12.5m of these were searchable 
using facial recognition software.17 
Borders and Immigration 
All passports issued to UK citizens since September 2006 
have been biometric.51 They contain an electronic chip that 
holds a digitised image of the passport holder’s face, which 
can be used to automatically verify the holder’s identity. 
When a traveller presents the passport at an ‘ePassport 
gate’, the gate takes a photo of the traveller’s face and 
compares this to the image on the chip using facial 
recognition technology.52 HM Passport Office also uses 
facial recognition technology to automatically identify 
potentially fraudulent passport applications.53,54 
People applying for a visa or seeking asylum in the UK have 
their fingerprints and photo taken during the application 
process, which are stored on a central database (IABS, Box 
3).49,55 New applications are checked to see if an applicant 
has applied before under a different name, by comparing 
with biometric records held in the database. A search of the 
national police fingerprint database (IDENT1, Box 3) is also 
used to check for any criminal history. The person’s identity 
can be verified upon entry to the UK, by comparing their 
fingerprints with those in the application.56  
The EU is adopting an entry/exit system, which will register 
the fingerprints and facial images of non-EU nationals on 
entry and exit from the Schengen area.57 This will help 
identify people inside the EU who are undocumented or 
have overstayed their visa.58 This system is expected to 
enter operation in 2020, and raises the possibility that the 
biometric information of UK nationals will be taken and 
stored on entry to the EU after Brexit.59  
Law Enforcement 
Biometric technologies used for law enforcement include 
fingerprints, DNA, facial recognition and voice recognition 
(POSTnote 509).60,61 This use is subject to the legislation 
outlined in Box 4. Biometric data are held in multiple 
databases (Box 3). The Home Office Biometrics Programme 
aims to replace existing Home Office biometric databases 
with a single system for accessing biometric data (Box 5). 
Fingerprints and DNA 
Fingerprints recovered from crime scenes can be used to 
search the national police and immigration databases 
Box 2. Biometric Systems 
Biometric systems are essentially pattern matching systems, which 
involve four main processes:1 
 Data capture – a sensor captures the biometric characteristics of 
the user, e.g. a camera taking an image of a person’s face. 
 Feature extraction – the biometric data captured by the sensor 
are processed into a digital form containing only the key 
distinguishing features required to identify the user. 
 Storage – biometric features are stored for future comparison as a 
reference record, either on a central database or on local storage 
(such as on a passport). 
 Comparison – an algorithm compares input biometric data with 
one or more reference records and gives a score for how close the 
match is. Depending on whether the score is over a certain 
threshold, the system declares either a match or a non-match. 
Most biometric systems are probabilistic and thus always involve 
some degree of error.30 A key consideration is the threshold set for 
accepting a match. A high threshold will lead to fewer false matches 
but more false non-matches (failures to identify a genuine match), and 
vice versa.31 The threshold chosen depends on the application. For 
example, at passport control, a high threshold may be set to reduce 
false matches that would lead to someone being wrongly admitted. 
For less secure applications (e.g. unlocking a smartphone) a lower 
threshold may be used to minimise users being falsely rejected. Other 
considerations include the speed of comparison and system cost.31  




   
 
(IDENT1 and IABS, Box 3).19 A match must be manually 
verified by a fingerprint expert before being used as 
evidence in court.74 DNA profiles generated from crime 
scene DNA can be compared to profiles in the National DNA 
Database (Box 3).75 A match provides strong evidence of 
association between an individual and the crime scene 
object that the DNA was recovered from (the chances of two 
unrelated people having identical DNA profiles is less than 
one in one billion).76,77 DNA evidence is used in court, but is 
the sole evidence only in exceptional cases.78 The quality of 
fingerprint and DNA evidence in the criminal justice system 
is overseen by the Forensic Science Regulator.79,80  
In 2015, the UK voted to join the Prüm convention, which 
enables the sharing of access to DNA profile, fingerprint and 
vehicle number plate data between EU states for the 
purposes of solving crime.81 Interpol procedures for sharing 
this information exist, but take an average of 143 days for 
DNA data compared to 15 minutes under Prüm.82 The UK is 
due to fully connect to the system in 2020, although it is 
unclear how this will be affected by Brexit.83,84 
Facial Images 
Since March 2014, police have been able to use images 
(e.g. CCTV footage) to search against facial images 
(custody images) on the Police National Database using 
facial recognition software (Box 3).89 The system calculates 
a ranked list of potential matches, which are manually 
inspected to confirm or reject a match. Matches are used for 
intelligence purposes; the Home Office has said that results 
are not treated as definitive evidence of identification.89  
Automated Facial Recognition 
UK police are trialling real-time automated facial recognition 
technology (AFR). This identifies people automatically from 
live video footage (e.g. CCTV), by comparing their face to a 
database of facial images.90 The Government has said that 
this database is a bespoke “watch list” that may include 
people banned from attending certain events, known 
criminals, and people wanted in connection with an 
investigation.91 The Metropolitan Police trialled AFR at the 
Notting Hill Carnival in 2016 and 2017.92,93 South Wales 
Police tested AFR at sporting events, shopping centres, and 
other events.94,95 Over a trial period from June 2017 to 
March 2018, 8.7% of matches were found to be correct.96 
Other countries are also using AFR. For example, the 
Singaporean Government is conducting trials to combine 
facial recognition with video and audio data to automatically 
detect unusual activity and persons of interest in public 
spaces.97 In China’s Xinjiang province, the government is 
reportedly using facial recognition to alert authorities if a 
person of interest leaves certain areas.98 
Policy Challenges 
Biometric technologies raise challenges in relation to 
legislation and regulation, data security, privacy, 
performance testing, cost-effectiveness, the potential for 
bias and public acceptance. 
Adequacy of Legislation and Regulation 
Questions have been raised about the adequacy of current 
legislation and regulation relating to the retention of custody 
images and to automated facial recognition. 
Custody Images 
UK legislation (Box 4) allows police to retain indefinitely the 
custody images of those they arrest, regardless of whether 
they are later convicted. In 2012, the High Court ruled this 
unlawful, on the basis that it is disproportionate to make no 
distinction between convicted and non-convicted people.68 
Following a Home Office review in February 2017,89 those 
who are not convicted can ask for their custody images to 
be deleted. Unlike DNA and fingerprint records, deletion is 
Box 4. Legislation Governing the Use of Biometrics 
General Legislation 
 Data Protection Act 2018 – implements the EU General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) and Law Enforcement Directive.62 It 
explicitly classifies biometric data as a ‘special’ type of data, 
making it subject to stricter processing rules.63-65 The Act defines 
biometric data as physical, physiological or behavioural 
characteristics that allow the unique identification of a person. The 
Biometrics Commissioner has suggested that this definition may 
also include patterns of social behaviour or ‘sociometrics’.13 
 Human Rights Act 1998 – states that everyone has the right to 
respect for their private life.66 The European Court of Human 
Rights (2008) and the UK High Court of Justice (2012) have ruled 
that the retention of fingerprints, DNA, and facial images by police 
interferes with this right, and hence must be justified and 
proportionate for the purposes of public safety.67,68 
Law Enforcement Legislation 
 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) – allows police 
to take and retain fingerprints, DNA and facial images following 
arrest, for the purpose of solving or preventing crime.69 Before the 
Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, DNA and fingerprints could be 
held indefinitely. 
 Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 – amended PACE in response 
to a ruling from the European Court of Human Rights that the 
indefinite retention of fingerprint and DNA data from people not 
convicted of a crime was unlawful.67,70 The new regime generally 
requires the automatic deletion of fingerprint and DNA data from 
people who are not convicted. However there are exceptions, for 
example, DNA and fingerprint data from those charged with a 
serious offence may be kept for three years. DNA and fingerprint 
data from those convicted of a recordable offence may be retained 
indefinitely. The Act created the roles of the Surveillance Camera 
Commissioner, who encourages compliance with the Surveillance 
Camera Code of Practice, and the Biometrics Commissioner.71,72 It 
also created a strategy board to oversee the police DNA and 
fingerprint databases.73  
Box 5. Home Office Biometrics Programme (HOB) 
The Home Office Biometrics programme was initiated in 2014 to 
provide a single point of access to biometric services for law 
enforcement and the Home Office, including HM Passport Office, 
Border Force, and UK Visas & Immigration.85 It aims to provide cost 
savings, make data sharing more efficient, and ensure service 
continuity when contracts for IDENT1 and IABS expire in 2019.86 
There will be biometric matching algorithms for fingerprints, DNA and 
facial images, and the capability to use additional types of biometric 
data in the future. The Biometrics and Forensics Ethics Group (which 
provides independent ethical advice to the Home Office) has set up a 
working group to provide feedback on the privacy impact assessments 
carried out by the Home Office during the programme.87,88 





not automatic, and police can refuse requests in certain 
circumstances. The Biometrics Commissioner (Box 4) has 
questioned whether the changes made by the Home Office 
review will be sufficient in the face of future legal 
challenges.13 In its Biometrics Strategy, the Home Office 
has said that it will enable more efficient review and 
automatic deletion of custody images by linking them to 
conviction status.15 The Home Office’s Biometrics and 
Forensics Ethics Group suggests that people who have 
been arrested are unlikely to be aware of their right to 
request the deletion of their images.99 As of October 2017, 
67 requests had been made (to 37 of 43 police forces).100  
Automated Facial Recognition 
No UK legislation specifically relates to the use of CCTV 
with facial recognition capabilities.101 The Surveillance 
Camera Code of Practice states that police use of facial 
recognition needs to be justified and proportionate,101 
although the Surveillance Camera Commissioner has no 
power to enforce this.102 The Information Commissioner’s 
Office’s Code of Practice for surveillance cameras also 
applies.103 The Biometrics Commissioner’s remit does not 
cover police use of custody images or AFR.104 He has 
acknowledged the potential benefits of AFR to policing, but 
has also called for debate and legislation from Parliament to 
address its use.105 The Biometrics Strategy says that the 
Home Office will: create an oversight and advisory board for 
AFR and facial images; update the Surveillance Camera 
Code of Practice; and consult with stakeholders on 
biometrics governance.15,91,106 
Data Security 
Biometric attributes cannot be altered easily and could be 
permanently compromised if obtained by an impostor.107 
Additionally, some biometric attributes are inherently public, 
increasing the risk of them being obtained without 
consent.1,108 For example, an impostor might try to use a 
photo of someone’s face, taken without their knowledge, to 
trick a facial recognition system.109 Systems are being 
developed to counter this by detecting when biometric data 
comes from an artefact, rather than a living person.110 
Security can also be enhanced by transforming the data 
before storage in such a way that the original biometric data 
cannot be recovered if the stored data are stolen.108 
Privacy  
The Information Commissioner’s Office encourages the 
consideration of privacy implications from the start of a 
biometrics project, through privacy impact assessments.111 
The Biometrics and Forensics Ethics Group has also issued 
a set of principles for using biometric technologies, 
highlighting the protection of privacy.112 However, balancing 
the societal benefits of biometrics with individuals’ rights to 
privacy is not straightforward.113,114 Some say that biometric 
technologies increase privacy by making personal data 
more secure and reducing the risk of identity fraud.115 
Others argue that biometric technologies, especially types 
that can identify people covertly and at a distance, present a 
threat to privacy by removing the possibility of anonymity. 
For instance, Big Brother Watch has raised concerns about 
the use of AFR by the police, as it automatically scans every 
face in view to check if it is on a watch list.116 The 
centralised storage of biometric data has also raised 
concerns of ‘function creep’. This is where information is 
used for purposes different to those that it was acquired 
for,114 potentially damaging public trust in biometric 
technologies.113 For example, India’s Aadhaar identity 
scheme was initiated to give marginalised groups proof of 
identity and access to welfare. Though enrolment was 
initially voluntary, the government is now aiming to make it a 
requirement for accessing many other services.117,118 
Performance Testing and Cost-effectiveness 
The Commons Science and Technology Committee has 
said it is essential for biometric systems that impact on civil 
liberties to be tested, to ensure they are dependable.12 This 
can be difficult and costly, as a large and demographically 
representative dataset is needed to test the accuracy of a 
biometric matching algorithm.119 Some of the most 
comprehensive tests are conducted by the National Physical 
Laboratory in the UK and the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology in the USA.120,121 Operating conditions are 
also important. For example, poor lighting can have a large 
impact on the performance of facial recognition 
systems.9,122,123  
Whilst noting the important role of biometric technologies in 
policing, the Biometrics Commissioner has pointed to a lack 
of research proving their cost-effectiveness, compared with 
investing in other policing procedures.19 The Home Office 
has said that it will commission research in this area.124 
Potential for Bias  
In some cases, facial recognition algorithms may be less 
good at recognising certain groups. One study compared 
several commercially available algorithms and found that 
accuracy was lower for people who were black, female or in 
the 18–30 years age group.125 This may be due to the 
demographic make-up of the databases used to develop 
and train the algorithms; another study found that algorithms 
developed in East Asian countries were less accurate when 
identifying Caucasian faces, and that those developed in the 
West were less accurate for East Asian faces.126  
Public Acceptance 
Research on public attitudes to biometric technologies is 
limited. One academic research project found that use of 
biometrics was the most concerning authentication method 
for members of the UK public, who had strong associations 
between biometrics and state control and surveillance.127 
However, a UK industry survey from 2016 concluded that 
61% of consumers thought that biometrics were just as 
secure, or more secure, than passwords, and 64% were 
comfortable using these technologies to access their online 
bank accounts.128 Other industry studies have reported that 
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